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Abstract 
This paper attempts a comparison across time and space, focusing on the transborder 
homeland nationalisms of Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia. Both involve claims to 
monitor the condition, support the welfare, and protect the rights and interests of external 
ethnonational kin – persons who are seen as “belonging” to the state in some way despite 
being residents and citizens of other states. There are superficially striking parallels between 
the target populations as well – the ethnic Germans stranded in an array of nationalizing 
successor states after the First World War, and the ethnic Russians (and other Russian-
speakers) similarly stranded after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Yet while noting 
these and other parallels, the paper focuses on key differences between the two cases, and 
between their broader interwar and contemporary contexts.  
Zusammenfassung 
Dieses Papier zielt darauf ab, einen Vergleich über Zeit und Raum hinweg anzustellen, 
wobei grenzüberschreitende “homeland Nationalismen” von Weimar Deutschland und der 
ehemaligen Sowjet Union untersucht werden. Beide erheben den Anspruch die 
Entwicklungen zu überwachen, den Wohlstand zu fördern und die Rechte und Interessen 
von “external ethnonational kin” – Personen, die auf die eine oder andere Art und Weise als 
“zugehörig” zum Staat gesehen werden, obwohl sie BürgerInnen und EinwohnerInnen 
anderer Staaten sind – zu schützen. Zumindest auf der Oberfläche ergeben sich auffallende 
Parallelen auch zwischen den Zielgruppen – den “ethnisch” Deutschen, die nach dem Ersten 
Weltkrieg in eine Reihe von Nachfolgestaaten verstreut wurden, und den “ethnischen” 
Russen (und anderen Gruppen, die Russisch sprechen) die auf eine ähnliche Weise nach 
dem Zerfall der Sowjet Union verstreut wurden. Obwohl dieses Papier diese und andere 
Parallelitäten aufgreift, werden auch wesentliche Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Fällen 
und dem jeweiligen breiteren Umfeld analysiert. 
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Introduction 
“Diaspora” has enjoyed a spectacular career recently in the social sciences and humanities.1 
Yet as the term has proliferated, its meaning has become less and less clear. At a minimum, 
the term involves some notion of dispersion in space and some reference to an actual or 
imagined homeland, from which the diaspora has become separated, yet towards which it 
remains oriented in some way – emotionally, imaginatively, or politically. All diasporas, 
understood in this way, involve a triadic nexus linking diaspora, homeland, and host country 
or countries.2 But this nexus can assume many different forms.  
In most contemporary discussions, the term “diaspora”, together with kindred terms such as 
“globalization”, “transnationalism”, and “identity” (especially when this last is understood as 
fractured, fragmented, multiple, fluid, and so on) evokes the image of a post-modern, 
uprooted, mobile, deterritorialized world. It suggests, moreover, a post-national world, a 
world in which the nation-state is no longer an appropriate category of analysis. 
The accidental diasporas I address in this paper belong to a very different world. Far from 
being post-national, this world might better be characterized as post-multinational. It came 
into being through the disintegration of previously multinational political structures: the 
breakup of the Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman Empires after the First World War, and of 
the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia at the end of the Cold War. These great 
reconfigurations of political space along national lines represented the apotheosis, not the 
repudiation, of the principle of the nation-state. They marked the triumph, not the 
transcendence, of the idea that national and state boundaries should coincide.3 
In these post-multinational settings, the nexus linking diaspora, homeland, and host country 
is intensely conflictual, and potentially explosive, in part because of the way in which the 
“homeland” can become involved. I analyze in this paper the way in which two “homelands” 
– Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia – have made far-reaching claims to monitor the 
condition, support the welfare, and protect the rights and interests of “their” respective 
                                                 
1  See among many others James Clifford, “Diasporas”, Cultural Anthropology 9[3] (1994), 302–338; William 
Safran, “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return”, Diaspora 1[1] (1991), 83–99; Khachig 
Tölölyan, “The Nation-State and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preface” Diaspora 1[1] (1991), 3–7; John Lie, “From 
International Migration of Transnational Diaspora”, Contemporary Sociology 24[4] (1995), 303–306; Robin Cohen, 
Global Diasporas: An Introduction (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). 
2  Gabriel Sheffer, “A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics” in Sheffer, ed., Modern 
Diasporas in International Politics (London and Sydney: Croon Helm, 1986), p. 1–15. 
3  The disintegration of the Soviet Union is often casually included in enumerations of phenomena purporting to 
show a trend towards the weakening or even the “transcendence” of the nation-state. The reverse is more nearly 
the case. The Soviet Union was itself an attempt – a failed attempt, but an attempt nonetheless – to “transcend” the 
nation-state by constructing an expressly multinational state, a state populated by dozens of major – and officially 
recognized – nationalities. Seen from this perspective, the breakup of the Soviet Union involved a move back to, 
rather than beyond, the nation-state. The same could be said of the breakup of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. 
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diasporas – the ethnic Germans who were scattered across Eastern Europe in the interwar 
period, and the ethnic Russians who are scattered across Soviet successor states today. 
In the burgeoning discussion of diasporas today, Germans and Russians would be among 
the last groups to spring to mind. In so far as Germany figures at all in the discussion, it is as 
a host country for labor diasporas, not as a homeland. Germans and Russians exemplify a 
very different kind of diaspora than that on which recent discussion has focused. They are 
what I have called in my title “accidental diasporas”.  
Let me explain what I mean by this term by contrasting accidental diasporas and the more 
familiar labor diasporas that have been at the center of much recent discussion. First, labor 
migrant diasporas are constituted by the movement of people across borders, accidental 
diasporas by the movement of borders across people. Second, migrant diasporas form 
gradually through countless individual migration trajectories, while accidental diasporas 
crystallize suddenly following a dramatic – and often traumatic – reconfiguration of political 
space. Third, labor migrant diasporas are constituted through the voluntary actions of those 
who comprise them, while accidental diasporas come into being without the participation, 
and often against the will, of their members. Fourth, labor migrant diasporas tend to be 
territorially dispersed, and to lack deep roots in their host countries, while accidental 
diasporas tend to be more concentrated and territorially rooted. Finally, labor migrant 
diasporas typically remain for some time citizens of their home countries, while members of 
accidental diasporas are citizens of the countries in which they live.4  
Of course the contrast between labor migrant diasporas and accidental diasporas is not as 
sharp in reality as I have drawn it here. Some labor migrations generate new forms of 
territorial concentration in host countries, while some accidental diasporas – or at least some 
parts of such diasporas – are territorially dispersed. Some labor migrants have acquired 
citizenship of their host countries, while some members of accidental diasporas – including 
most Russians and other Russian speakers in Estonia and Latvia – have not.  
Moreover – and this is a point I want to dwell on for a moment – most accidental diasporas, 
like labor diasporas, have been shaped to some extent by migration. But the migration in 
question occurred long ago. The German Drang nach Osten, for example, began in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, as peasant settlements spread eastward beyond the zone of 
                                                 
4  There are obviously other kinds of diasporas than the two forms I’ve contrasted here. Besides the archetypal 
Jewish diaspora one might mention the classical trading diasporas and their modern-day successors, sometimes 
known as middleman minorities (Edna Bonacich, “A Theory of Middleman Minorities”, American Sociological Review 
38 [1973], 583–594); the “mobilized diasporas” conceptualized by John Armstrong (“Mobilized and Proletarian 
Diasporas”, American Political Science Review 70 [1970]); and the diasporas constituted by the slave trade and by 
other forms of unfree labor within colonial empires. And of course many other distinctions could be drawn. I have 
focused on one particular contrast – and have drawn the contrast as sharply as possible – in order to highlight the 
distinctiveness of the diasporas I address in this paper.  
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consolidated German settlement, creating a pattern of mixed settlement in the German-Slav 
borderlands that was to last until the middle of the twentieth century. Later, in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, German colonists were invited to settle in many areas 
of the Habsburg and Russian empires – notably in Hungary, Transylvania, parts of the former 
Yugoslavia, and the Volga region of Russia. But even the last of these colonists had been 
settled for a century and a half by the time their world was turned upside down by the 
collapse of the great multinational empires. Needless to say, they did not see themselves as 
“immigrants”.  
Russians, too, had been moving outward for centuries – mainly eastward and southward – 
from the original core area of Russian settlement in what is today northwestern Russia. This 
migration, to be sure, continued under the Soviet regime, and was in part sponsored by the 
regime.5 So some of those who found themselves abruptly transformed, by the collapse of 
the Soviet state, from privileged citizens of a great power into precariously situated minorities 
in precariously existing states had themselves migrated from Russia to one of the non-
Russian republics. Yet most belonged to families that had settled permanently – or what they 
thought was permanently – in the non-Russian republics; in many cases their families had 
resided there over several generations. And even those who had themselves migrated from 
Soviet core to periphery had not crossed state borders; rather, they had moved within the 
territory of the Soviet state. This migration was not only legally and politically defined as 
internal migration, but was psychologically experienced as such. As a result, these migrants 
too did not think of themselves as “immigrants”.  
Thus both Germans and Russians were involved in long and gradual processes of outward 
dispersion from original core areas of settlement. But unlike labor migrant diasporas, they 
crystallized as diasporas through the sudden, traumatic movement of borders across people 
as multinational empires shattered into would-be nation-states.  
This radical redrawing of the political map, at the beginning of the “short twentieth century”6 
and again at its end, was intended to resolve national conflicts. But as we now know all too 
well, in both periods it simply reframed and in some cases aggravated such conflicts. The 
very process of satisfying some national claims generated new ones, largely because almost 
all of the would-be nation-states that emerged from the rubble of empire contained large and 
alienated national minorities, many of whom felt themselves to “belong” by ethnocultural 
nationality, though not by legal citizenship, to a “homeland” state from which they were 
separated by new – or newly significant – state borders. 
                                                 
5  See Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics (London: Hurst, 1995). 
6  Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 (London: Michael Joseph, 
1994)  
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Speaking schematically, we can say that the nationalization of previously multinational 
political space generated three interlocking forms of nationalism – all quite distinct from the 
state-seeking nationalisms on which the literature on nationalist politics has focused. The 
first is what I call the “nationalizing” nationalism of newly independent (or newly reconfigured) 
states. This involves claims made in the name of a “core nation” or nationality, defined in 
ethnocultural terms, and sharply distinguished from the citizenry as a whole. The core nation 
is understood as the legitimate “owner” of the state, and the state is conceived as the state 
of and for the core nation. Yet despite having “its own” state, the core nation is represented 
as being in a weak or embattled cultural, economic, or demographic position within the state. 
This is seen as a legacy of discrimination against the nation before it attained independence. 
This putative discrimination, in turn, it is held to justify the “remedial” or “compensatory” 
project of using state power to promote the specific interests of the core nation. Examples of 
such nationalizing states include Poland, Romania, and to a lesser extent Czechoslovakia in 
the interwar period; and Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Croatia, and of course Serbia 
today.7 
Directly challenging these “nationalizing” nationalisms are the transborder nationalisms of 
what I call “external national homelands”. Homeland nationalisms are oriented to putative 
ethnonational kin who are residents and citizens of other states. They assert states’ right – 
indeed their obligation – to monitor the condition, promote the welfare, support the activities 
and institutions, and protect the interests of “their” ethnonational kin in other states. (I place 
scare quotes around “their” in order to highlight the problematic quality of that seemingly 
innocent possessive pronoun.) Such claims are typically made, and typically have greatest 
force and resonance, when the ethnonational kin in question are seen as threatened by the 
nationalizing policies and practices of the state in which they live. Homeland nationalisms 
thus arise in direct opposition to and in dynamic interaction with nationalizing nationalisms. 
Examples of homeland nationalism include Weimar Germany (and, in a very different mode, 
Nazi Germany), as well as Hungary and Bulgaria, in the interwar period; and (again in 
sharply differing ways) Russia and Hungary today, as well as Serbia during the early 
(Croatian) phase of the wars of the Yugoslav succession.  
Although analytically distinct, homeland and nationalizing nationalisms are not mutually 
exclusive. Serbia was a brutally nationalizing state vis-à-vis Albanians in Kosovo and an 
external national homeland vis-à-vis Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia, in 
turn, was an almost equally brutal nationalizing state vis-à-vis Serbs in the Krajina region of 
Croatia and an external national homeland vis-à-vis Croats in the quasi-state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Romania is a nationalizing state vis-à-vis Hungarians, a homeland vis-à-vis 
Romanians in Moldova. Russia today is a homeland for transborder Russians, but it is also 
                                                 
7  I develop further the notion of “nationalizing state” through a discussion of the interwar Polish case in 
Nationalism Reframed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Chapter 4. 
I H S — Rogers Brubaker / Accidental Diasporas and External “Homelands”  — 5 
(potentially) a nationalizing state vis-à-vis non-Russian minorities in Russia. Interwar 
Germany was of course not only an external national homeland for transborder Germans, 
but a murderously nationalizing state vis-à-vis Jews.) 
The third characteristic form of post-multinational nationalism is the minority nationalism of 
the accidental diasporas themselves. Minority nationalist stances involve a self-
understanding in specifically “national” rather than merely “ethnic” terms, a demand for state 
recognition of their distinct ethnocultural nationality, and the assertion of certain collective, 
nationality-based cultural or political rights. This specifically national, rather than merely 
ethnic, mode of self-understanding, and the political stance that goes along with it, again 
distinguished “accidental”, post-multinational diasporas from the diasporic formations most 
widely discussed today. Salient examples include Germans in many Eastern European 
countries in the interwar period and Hungarian and (in a more problematic sense) Russian 
minorities today.8  
There is considerable variation not only between these forms of nationalism but within each 
form. For example, the explicit, self-conscious nationalizing policies of Estonia differ 
markedly from the milder and subtler nationalizing policies and practices characteristic of 
post-independence Ukraine, and from the on declared but in practice strongly nationalizing 
practices of Kazakhstan; and all of these differ from the violently homogenizing nationalizing 
policies and practices of Serbia and Croatia. Or, to take another example, the well-
organized, well-financed minority nationalism of Hungarians in Romania today differs 
markedly from the generally passive, disorganized stance of Russians in most Soviet 
successor states. Finally, the culturally oriented, carefully modulated homeland nationalism 
of post-communist Hungary, oriented to Hungarian minorities in neighboring states, differs 
dramatically from the aggressive, destabilizing homeland nationalism of Serbia in the context 
of the breakup of Yugoslavia. There is of course striking variation on lower levels of 
aggregation as well – variation, for example, among and even within differently situated 
Hungarian minority communities in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Ukraine. And there has 
been great variation over time in Serbian homeland nationalism, Estonian nationalizing 
nationalism, and so on. As I’ve argued elsewhere, these forms of nationalism should not be 
conceived as fixed forms or as “forces” varying only in intensity, but rather as variably 
configured, dynamically changing interactive “fields”, as arenas of struggle between 
differentiated and competing “stances”.9 Yet despite this heterogeneity and variation at all 
levels of aggregation, these three forms of nationalism –nationalizing nationalism, homeland 
                                                 
8  Like homeland nationalisms, minority nationalisms arise in direct opposition to and in dynamic interaction with 
nationalizing nationalisms. But minorities are not necessarily aligned with the external national homelands that claim 
to speak in their name. Hungarian minority politicians in Romania, for example, protested against the “Basic Treaty” 
signed in 1996 between Hungary and Romania; while Hungarian officials claimed that the treaty would help protect 
the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Romania, many minority Hungarians contested this and argued that they were 
“sold out” by a government unsympathetic to their claims for autonomy and collective rights. 
9  Nationalism Reframed, Chapter 3. 
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nationalism, and minority nationalism – are defined in dynamic interaction with one another 
and directly engendered by the incomplete nationalization of previously multinational political 
space. For purposes of comparative analysis, this warrants thinking in terms of a single 
dynamically interactive field of post-multinational nationalisms.  
Nationalizing policies, cross-border homeland nationalism, and autonomist minority 
nationalism are of course not the only forms of nationalism that flourished in interwar Central 
and Eastern Europe or that flourish today. There are a few state-seeking nationalisms – in 
Kosovo and Chechnya today, for example. There have been instances of traditional “great-
power” nationalism. There have been many instances of defensive, protective, populist 
nationalism, seeking to protect the national economy, language, mores, or cultural patrimony 
against putative threats from outside. The bearers of such alleged threats are diverse but 
can include foreign capital, transnational organizations, today for example the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), immigrants, powerful foreign cultural influences, and so on. Although 
related to the nationalizing nationalisms sketched above, such “defensive nationalisms” are 
analytically distinct from them, for they do not presuppose ethnonational heterogeneity but 
are found also in ethnically relatively homogeneous countries such as Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, and Hungary today. 
However, these other forms of nationalism stand analytically apart from the first three, 
though they are often intertwined with them in practice. Unlike the first three forms I 
identified, these additional forms are neither defined in mutual interaction with one another 
nor directly engendered by the incomplete nationalization of previously multinational political 
space. For my purposes, the relevant field for comparative analysis is constituted by the 
dynamically interacting set of nationalizing, homeland, and minority nationalisms.10  
I attempt here a comparison across time and space, focusing on transborder homeland 
nationalisms, the least well explored of these three interlocking forms of nationalism. In the 
interwar period, the transborder homeland nationalisms of Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria 
collided explosively with the nationalizing nationalisms of Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Romania, giving rise to tensions and crises that were closely bound up with the outbreak of 
the Second World War.  
Seemingly analogous collisions threaten the stability and security of the region today. In 
some cases they have already led to war. The interplay between the nationalizing 
                                                 
10  This field offers rich and largely untapped possibilities for comparative analysis, and one can obviously cut into it 
analytically in many different ways, at many different levels of aggregation, and using many different strategies of 
comparative analysis. I present one such cut here, at an extreme macro level of aggregation. In other work in the 
same broad field, I’ve been working at lower levels of aggregation, most recently in an ethnographic mode, and at a 
micro-interactionist level of analysis; so I am certainly not claiming any privileged status for the kind of extreme 
macro perspective I offer here. 
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nationalism of Croatia and the homeland nationalism of Serbia (along with the minority 
nationalism of Croatia’s borderland Serbs) led to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Similarly, the 
interplay between the nationalizing nationalism of Azerbaijan and the homeland nationalism 
of Armenia (initially sparked by the minority nationalism of Karabakh Armenians) led to the 
war over Nagorno-Karabakh. And of course the recent war over Kosovo was part by the 
clash between the nationalizing nationalism of Serbia and the minority nationalism of Kosovo 
Albanians, whose weapons, for the most part, flowed over the border from the neighboring 
external national homeland of Albania after the near-complete breakdown of state authority 
there in 1997. Elsewhere too this fault line remains unstable. The nationalizing nationalisms 
of Romania and Slovakia, vis-a-vis their Hungarian minorities, have clashed, though not 
violently, with the homeland nationalism of Hungary. The nationalizing nationalism of 
Bulgaria vis-a-vis its Turkish minority faces the potential homeland nationalism of 
neighboring Turkey.  
The most important, and seemingly most dangerous, clash along this fault line today is 
between the nationalizing nationalisms of Soviet successor states and the homeland 
nationalism of Russia. Serious tensions have already been generated by this clash. The 
nationalizing policies and politics of Estonia and Latvia, especially their restrictive citizenship 
policies towards their large Russian minorities, have met with harsh Russian condemnations 
of “apartheid” and “ethnic cleansing”. Chronic tensions between Ukraine and Russia over 
Russian-dominated Crimea flared up in 1994 when the Crimean Russian leadership 
declared itself virtually independent of central Ukrainian authority and sought closer ties to 
Russia. Tensions between Kazakhstan and Russia, too, have increased over the hardening 
nationalizing policies of the Kazakh regime in the Russian-dominated north. And a limited 
war broke out in Moldova in summer 1992 between the then strongly nationalizing Moldovan 
state and the secessionist, Russian-led “Dniester Republic”, backed by the Russian 14th 
army.  
Yet despite these tensions, I want to argue that the clash between Russian homeland 
nationalism and the nationalizing nationalisms of Soviet successor states is less explosive 
and less dangerous than one might think. I develop this argument by way of a comparison 
between interwar and contemporary homeland nationalisms, focusing on Weimar Germany 
and post Soviet Russia. 
This is a large and unruly comparison. From a methodological point of view, such a 
comparison – across large stretches of space, time, and context – cannot pretend to be 
“controlled”.11 The two cases differ in any number of ways that might plausibly be linked to 
                                                 
11  In particular, such comparisons cannot claim to be based on John Stuart Mill’s “method of difference”. I agree 
with the criticisms of attempts to use this method advanced, among others, by Stanley Lieberson, “Small N’s and 
Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases”, 
Social Forces  70[2] (1991), 307–320. 
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the kind of nationalism that interests me. Comparative analysis here affords no surefire 
method of causal attribution or hypothesis-testing. I compare for the frankly exploratory and 
preliminary purpose of mapping out a field of investigation and suggesting certain lines of 
analysis, not for the more conventional purpose of ascertaining the cause of a particular 
outcome or otherwise testing a hypothesis.  
Moreover, the kind of comparative analysis I undertake is not the classic kind that Charles 
Tilly calls “variation-finding” comparison. It is rather what Tilly calls “individualizing” or what I 
would call “configurational” comparison.12 My main concern is not with specific differences in 
outcome – though there are differences in outcome that interest me. It is rather to specify the 
distinctiveness of the overall configuration of homeland nationalist claims and practices in 
the interwar period and the present, using Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia as 
examples. Towards the end of the paper, I make some arguments linking these distinctive 
configurations to differences in outcome – but I present these as preliminary, speculative 
lines of interpretation, not as testable propositions.  
If comparison isn’t of the variation-explaining, hypothesis-testing sort, why do it? What is the 
point of such “small-N”, exploratory, individualizing comparison? This is a large and 
controversial issue, and I don’t want to dwell on it here. I present here a substantive, not a 
methodological argument. But I want to signal in telegraphic fashion how one might make 
the case for this type of comparative analysis – not, to be sure, as the only legitimate type of 
comparative analysis, but as one legitimate type among others.  
I would argue, first, that it is valuable in itself to characterize in rich fashion the individual 
distinctiveness of important historical configurations. This, I take it, is a crucial part of 
Weber’s epistemological stance. Second, comparative analysis – in which we “think” one 
case against and by means of another, is an indispensable means of sharpening such 
characterizations of individual distinctiveness. This holds regardless of whether the 
comparison is fully “controlled”. Again, I take this to be a fundamental Weberian point. Third, 
such individualizing comparison may suggest lines of analysis for explanatory, variation-
finding comparison. Finally, such preliminary individualizing comparison may help us avoid 
premature, inadequately framed variation-finding comparison. As Tilly put it, we have to “get 
the history right” before generalizing, if only in order to have any confidence in the 
soundness of our generalizations.13 
                                                 
12  Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons  (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984), 
p.83.  
13  Tilly, p. 79. 
I H S — Rogers Brubaker / Accidental Diasporas and External “Homelands”  — 9 
Weimar homeland nationalism 
Let me turn now to the comparative argument itself.14 Weimar homeland nationalism built on 
a model established in Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany. Its roots, of course, go further 
back, reflecting the longstanding incongruence and tension between the imagined 
community of the nation and the organizational reality of the state in German history. But it 
was the exclusion of millions of Germans, especially eight million Austro-Germans, from the 
Prussian-dominated “kleindeutsch” nation-state founded in 1871 that first created the 
possibility of homeland nationalism. This possibility was actualized a few decades later when 
nationalist pressure groups like the German School Association and the Pan-German 
League began urging state support for transborder Germans, whose long-privileged position 
in the Habsburg and Romanov empires was eroding under the challenge of non-German 
national movements. But movements in late Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany to 
support transborder Germans remained politically weak; the state remained basically 
indifferent to Germans outside the Reich.  
This changed sharply after the First World War, for two reasons. First, the status of ethnic 
Germans outside Germany changed drastically. The status reversal was perhaps most 
drastic for the former Reich Germans in the territories ceded to Poland, but it was dramatic 
for other Germans too, transformed from the Staatsvolk  or state-bearing nation of the 
Habsburg Empire or from privileged status group in the Romanov Empire to beleaguered 
minorities within the much smaller and highly nationalist states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Italy, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Baltics. 
Secondly, the Weimar Republic – its basic territorial and institutional parameters deeply 
contested and lacking legitimacy – could not claim to adequately “embody” the German 
nation, and therefore could not “contain” nationalism within the institutional and territorial 
frame of the state – something that the geopolitically prestigious, “successful” Bismarckian 
and Wilhelmine state had done remarkably well. In Weimar, the category “nation” was 
detached from the frame of the week and weekly legitimate state, and again identified with 
an allegedly robust, state-transcending, ethnocultural nation or Volk .15 
                                                 
14  For a more detailed historical account and references to the literature on which the argument rests, see 
Nationalism Reframed, Chapter 5. This chapter closely follows the account given there. 
15  To anticipate: post-Soviet Russia doesn’t adequately “contain” “the nation” either – but “nation” is not as central 
a category as it was in Weimar Germany. Nationhood was strongly institutionalized for non-Russians, but, 
paradoxically, weakly institutionalized for Russians. This was true in the Czarist Empire, and it remained true in the 
Soviet Union (the main difference between the two was that non-Russian nationhood and nationality were much 
more strongly institutionalized in the Soviet Union than in the Czarist Empire.) This lack of strong institutionalization 
of the category “Russian” may help explain the political passivity of Russians in Soviet successor states so far. On 
this passivity, see Neil Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia (London: Royd Institute of International Affairs, 1995); on 
post-Soviet Russian passivity more generally, see also Tim McDaniel, “Social Collapse and Political Passivity: the 
dual legacy of the crisis of Russian values”, (Manuscript, Department of Sociology, UCSD, 1997). 
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In these new circumstances, homeland nationalism flourished in Weimar civil society. Scores 
of new Deutschtum- or “Germandom”-oriented associations and organizations sprang up, 
while churches, schools, and other associations organized activities in support of co-
nationals abroad.  
Civil society homeland nationalism had already existed, though on a much smaller scale, 
before the war. What was new in Weimar was continuous, high-level state activity on behalf 
of transborder Germans. Its core was covert financial support for Germans and German 
organizations abroad, mainly for schools, newspapers, churches, charitable organizations, 
social and cultural activities, and economic enterprises. This covert financial support was 
linked to wider foreign policy aims, but in differentiated fashion, as can be seen by 
comparing Poland and Czechoslovakia, the two most important “targets” of Weimar 
homeland nationalism.  
In both states, Germans comprised territorially concentrated, borderland minority 
communities, unexpectedly and unwillingly transformed into national minorities, and 
considering themselves second-class citizens of 3rd-class states. Yet there were three key 
differences between these cases. 
First, Germans of Western Poland had been citizens of Germany until 1919; Germans of 
Bohemia and Moravia had been citizens of the Habsburg Empire, and had never in modern 
times been united with Reich Germans in a single state. Second, there was a mass exodus 
of Germans from Western Poland to Germany after the war, but no large migration of 
Sudeten Germans. Third, Germany harbored territorial claims against Poland but not against 
Czechoslovakia. Reflecting these contextual differences, Weimar policies towards 
transborder Germans in these two neighboring states differed sharply. 
Towards Germans in Poland, Weimar policies sought above all to curb large-scale 
resettlement; this was linked to the longer-term strategic aim of sustaining future revisionist 
claims. After all, if the mass exodus could not be stemmed, and if no Germans remained in 
the territories ceded to Poland, it would be more difficult to make future claims for border 
revision.  
Toward Germans in Czechoslovakia, Weimar policy was governed neither by any overriding 
immediate imperatives nor by clear long-term strategic aims. Yet Weimar support for 
Germans in Czechoslovakia was not wholly innocent of political design. In a number of ways, 
Weimar Germany used the question of the status of Sudeten Germans to gain diplomatic 
leverage in pursuit of other foreign policy aims – especially to promote the interprenetration 
of the German and Czechoslovak economies as part of a broader aspiration for German 
economic hegemony in East Central Europe and the Balkans.  
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The final aspect of Weimar homeland nationalism that I want to signal is that the public side 
of homeland nationalism was muted – somewhat surprisingly, given the vigor of civil society 
homeland nationalism and the elaborate program of covert support for German minorities 
abroad. In post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, homeland nationalism has a much higher profile 
in public discourse – a point I return to below.  
At certain political conjunctures, official homeland nationalist rhetoric did become more 
salient in Weimar Germany. But even after Germany joined the League of Nations – a step it 
justified in part by arguing that League membership would give Germany an ideal platform 
from which to defend the rights of German minorities abroad – Foreign Minister Stresemann 
was quite cautious about pressing issues connected with transborder Germans, and was 
much more concerned with other, more classically statist aims. 
Weimar homeland nationalism can be characterized in summary as a complex web of 
political stances, cultural idioms, organizational networks, and transborder social relations. 
As a political phenomenon, homeland nationalism involved a set of “moves” in both domestic 
and international political arenas. In the domestic arena, these moves were intertwined with 
party competition; in the interstate arena, they were bound up with – and generally 
subordinate to – Germany’s efforts to recover sovereignty, revise the Treaty of Versailles, 
and re-establish its position as a Great Power and regional hegemon. Because of this 
intertwining, Weimar homeland nationalism cannot be understood solely in terms of its own 
“internal” logic; it cannot be analyzed as an “autonomous” domain of politics.  
As a cultural phenomenon, Weimar homeland nationalism involved the development and 
widespread use of a set of idioms of identification with, and responsibility for, transborder 
Germans. These idioms represented transborder Germans as full members of the German 
national community or Volk . In this discourse, “nation” and “Volk” were detached from the 
frame of the state and redefined in ethnocultural terms. Externally, this granted membership 
in the nation to transborder Germans; internally, and more fatefully, it denied membership to 
German Jews. This new Volk-oriented discourse of nationhood was articulated and 
propagated by journalists, publicists, scholars, emigrés from transborder German 
communities, and activists in Germandom-oriented associations and organizations. These 
idioms were then appropriated and used by politicians and state officials as well, though to a 
limited extent, in fragmentary fashion, and without the anti-statist implications of consistently 
Volk-oriented discourse. 
As an organizational phenomenon, Weimar homeland nationalism involved a network of 
state agencies, state-controlled (though nominally private) organizations, and voluntary 
associations. This network provided an extensive array of organized sites for the 
development of Germandom-oriented expertise and activities. The leading personnel in 
these organizations and associations were well connected with one another, partly through 
overlapping memberships and interlocking directorates, partly through joint participation in a 
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variety of meetings on the affairs of transborder Germans. Together, they constituted an 
organized “public”, a structured, differentiated space of communication, discussion, and 
debate. 
As a social-relational phenomenon, finally, Weimar homeland nationalism involved a dense 
network of cross-border relations and resource flows. These not only linked transborder 
Germans to Weimar Germany but, perhaps more importantly, contributed to detaching them 
from the states in which they lived. This restructuring of social networks and relations was 
most important in the case of the Sudeten Germans. Their networks and relations had long 
been framed by the Habsburg state but were substantially restructured after its collapse. 
One aspect of this involved the weakening of Sudeten Germans traditional ties with Vienna 
and the strengthening of ties with Berlin and Germany. This, in turn, encouraged the Sudeten 
German elite to look to Germany for solutions to their problems rather than to seek to resolve 
them within the Czechoslovak state. 
The vicissitudes of homeland nationalism after the Nazi seizure of power cannot be 
addressed here. It is worth noting in passing, however, that the Nazis appropriated the 
political, cultural, organizational, and social-relational legacy of Weimar homeland 
nationalism: the calculated deployment of homeland nationalist stances in domestic and 
international arenas; the völkisch idioms of identification with and responsibility for 
transborder Germans; the network of agencies, organizations, and associations concerned 
with connationals abroad; and the web of cross-border ties and resource flows. In this sense, 
one can speak of continuity between Weimar and Nazi homeland nationalism. And there was 
in fact no abrupt break in the early years of the new regime. Indeed, homeland nationalist 
themes at first receded from public view as the regime focused on internal consolidation, 
pursued an initially cautious line in foreign policy, and discouraged the press from focusing 
on the problems of the German minority in Poland in the wake of the German-Polish Non-
Aggression Pact of 1934. 
Yet the Weimar legacy was radically transformed in the context of the aggressive Nazi 
foreign policy of the late 1930s (and further transformed in the context of imperialist war and 
German occupation in the East). The cautious diplomatic use of homeland nationalist 
themes in Weimar gave way to the blustering fulminations of Hitler in the months preceding 
the Munich agreement. The völkisch discourse of identification with and responsibility for 
transborder Germans was redefined by the Nazi commitment to establishing a 
grossdeutsches Reich incorporating the entire area of consolidated German settlement. 
Germandom-oriented associations were ruthlessly gleichgeschaltet, subordinated to the 
state and party apparatus, and the “traditionalist” homeland nationalist leaders, committed to 
the integrity and autonomy of German minority communities, were displaced by others who 
did not hesitate to subordinate the concerns of transborder minorities to the imperatives of 
Reich foreign policy. The web of cross-border ties, finally, permitted Hitler to use the Sudeten 
Germans, in 1938, as a fifth column in his plan to destroy the Czechoslovak state. 
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Homeland nationalism in contemporary Russia 
I turn now to contemporary Russia. Just as the collapse of the Willhemine, Habsburg, and 
Romanov empires stranded millions of Germans, so the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
stranded millions of Russians – indeed far more Russians, some 25 million in all – in an 
array of successor states. These successor states, like those of the interwar period, are 
nationalizing states, established as the states of and for particular ethnocultural nations. The 
new Russian minorities, like Germans in the interwar period, are represented in Russian 
media and public life as threatened by the nationalizing policies and practices of the 
successor states. Like Weimar Germany, post-Soviet Russia has suffered what can be 
construed as a “humiliating” loss not only of territory but of its status as a Great Power. As in 
Weimar, this has created an opening for political entrepreneurs with a variety of remedial, 
compensatory, or restorationist political agendas.  
There are many further parallels between Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia that 
bear at least indirectly on homeland nationalism, including deep economic crisis, a new and 
fragile democratic regime, and geopolitical and economic preponderance vis-à-vis 
neighboring states. These parallels are so superficially striking that they have led some 
journalists and commentators to speak of “Weimar Russia”.  
I want to distance myself from this notion, seductive though it is. My comparison of 
transborder homeland nationalism in Weimar Germany and contemporary Russia does not 
rest on a belief that these are fundamentally or deeply similar cases. They are comparable 
cases in so far as both belong to the broader universe of post-multinational nationalisms that 
I sketched above. But precisely their comparability permits me to highlight fundamental 
differences between the cases, and between the broader interwar and contemporary 
contexts in which they are situated.  
I want to explore three differences in the forms – and formative contexts – of homeland 
nationalism in the two settings. The first concerns the greater visibility of official Russian 
homeland nationalism, the second the weakness of civil society homeland nationalism in 
Russia, and the third the ambiguity of the population targeted by Russian homeland 
nationalism.  
Official Weimar homeland nationalism transpired primarily behind the scenes. Our 
knowledge of it comes mainly from administrative archives, not from the records of public 
speech. The homeland nationalism of Weimar civil society was public and visible, but that of 
the state was largely covert.  
Russia, by contrast, has been anything but reticent; its official homeland nationalism has 
been conspicuously visible. There is no doubt an important covert dimension as well, but 
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that’s another issue; what I want to underscore here is the public and visible dimension of 
official Russian homeland nationalism, a dimension largely lacking from official Weimar 
homeland nationalism. Public pronouncements on the right, and the obligation, to protect 
Russians in the near abroad have become a staple of official Russian discourse, figuring 
prominently in accounts of Russian foreign policy priorities.  
Demonstrative rhetoric has been complemented by an official, public codification of the 
“fundamental guidelines” of Russian policy vis-à-vis “compatriots” in the near abroad, 
outlining a series of thirty-nine governmental measures. Although the Weimar government 
adopted a number of similar measures, it did not – and could not – admit to maintaining 
direct contacts with transborder ethnic Germans, funding their organizations, supporting their 
economic life, or underwriting their German-language press and educational institutions. This 
suggests two key differences in the international context of homeland nationalism between 
the interwar period and the present.  
The first difference is normative and institutional. The principle of territorial sovereignty was 
far more robust in the interwar period. Today, the exclusive claims of the nation-state to 
internal sovereignty have weakened through the growth of a complex web of cross-border 
jurisdictions in various policy domains, while transborder concern about the rights of 
minorities – like transborder concern for human rights is widely seen as more legitimate.16  
The second salient difference is geopolitical. Russian military, political, and economic 
preponderance vis-à-vis neighboring states is much greater than that of Weimar Germany 
vis-à-vis East Central Europe. This enables Russia to adopt an assertive stance on Russian 
minorities abroad, while at the same time the weakening of models of sovereignty and the 
new international legitimacy of transborder concerns with minorities enable it to frame its 
tough talk in newly legitimate idioms of human and minority rights.  
This suggests a further contextual difference. Weimar foreign policy consistently, albeit 
peacefully, sought changes in territorial borders. Russia, on the other hand – perhaps 
precisely because of its overwhelming dominance in the region – is not necessarily 
committed to territorial revision. It’s true that the present borders of the Russian Federation 
are universally seen as arbitrary, as lacking any historical sanction or normative dignity; yet 
they are not universally regarded as in urgent need of revision. Territorial revision is indeed 
pushed by certain political entrepreneurs, who claim to find intolerable the existence of 
                                                 
16  On international institutionalized legitimacy in the context of an emergent “world polity”, see John W. Meyer, 
“The World Polity and the “Authority of the Nation-State”, in George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. 
Ramirez, and John Boli, Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual  (Newbury Park: Sage, 
1987). On the institutionalized international legitimacy of human rights discourse, see Yasemin Soysal, Limits of 
Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
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Ukraine as a separate state or the fact that six million Russians live under Kazakh rule. But 
border revision lacks the fundamental, unquestioned status it had in Weimar Germany. Why? 
I think this reflects on the one hand a decline in the “material” significance of territory – a 
partial “de-territorialization” and economization of power, and, on the other hand, in seeming 
opposition to this, the institutional reification and “sacralization” of existing territorial frontiers 
in international discourse and international organizations.17 The former makes border 
changes less necessary; the latter makes them more difficult.  
By comparison with the interwar period, borders have become more “inviolable”, but they 
have also become more insignificant. This dual development makes territorial revisionism a 
costly, “inefficient”, and, it could be argued, ultimately unnecessary way to augment state 
power, even for many of those whose agendas are commonly labeled “neo-imperialist”.18  
On a more speculative note, I suggest there may be a connection between the ubiquitous 
corruption in post-Soviet Russia and the weakness of classical territorial revisionism. 
Because it is so ridden with corruption in every domain and at every level, the Russian state 
may be simply incapable of acting in the coherently statist manner posited by realist 
international relations theory. Michael Mann has cautioned against overestimating the 
coherence of putatively unitary states.19 But if this caution applies, say, too late nineteenth 
century Germany, how much more forcefully it would apply to contemporary Russia. There is 
no coherent state in Russia today. In these circumstances, why should state elites in any 
sector, including the military, pursued changes in territorial borders? Doesn’t it make more 
sense for them to “live and let live”, to simply take their cut of whatever deal happens their 
way? 
If the official homeland nationalism of post-Soviet Russia has been more public and visible 
than that of Weimar Germany, civil society homeland nationalism has been much less visible 
in the Russian case. This is the second difference I want to underscore. Reportage and 
commentary on Russians outside Russia has figured prominently in the Russian press. But 
the core of civil society homeland nationalism in Weimar Germany – the dense and vigorous 
network of associations concerned with coethnics abroad – has no counterpart in post-Soviet 
Russia. This reflects of course the general weakness of civil society in Soviet successor 
                                                 
17  On the declining significance of territory, see Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce 
and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986). 
18  Drawing on Michael Doyle’s definition of empire, Ronald Suny argues against conflating an “imperial project” 
proper, involving the establishment (or re-establishment) of full sovereignty by a center over a distinct and 
subordinate periphery, with “Great Power hegemony”, involving a relation of domination between separate states, 
and suggests that the latter is more likely in the case of post-Soviet Russia. See his “Ambiguous Categories: States, 
Empires and Nations”, Post-Soviet Affairs 11[2] (1995), 193–4. 
19  Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume II. The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760–1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Chapter 3. 
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states. It also reflects the fact that civil society homeland nationalism in Weimar Germany 
could build, ideologically and organizationally, on an established pre-war tradition of concern 
for Germandom abroad. Needless to say, there was no comparable tradition of concern for 
Russians outside Russia in the Soviet era.  
The last difference concerns the much greater ambiguity of the population targeted by 
Russian homeland nationalism. Weimar homeland nationalism was addressed 
unambiguously to persons who were German by ethnocultural nationality but not by 
citizenship.20 In Russia, by contrast, there is no agreement about how to define the persons 
in need of Russian “protection”. Five terms have been widely used to identify the relevant 
population. Most clearly paralleling Weimar homeland nationalism are claims to protect 
russkie, that is Russians by ethnocultural nationality. The second term, rossiiane, also 
ordinarily translated as “Russians”, in principle construes Russianness in territorial rather 
than ethnocultural terms, but in practice serves more as a “politically correct” substitute for 
russkie (politically correct because it acknowledges the multiethnic population of Russia).  
The third widely used term is russkoiazychnye, or Russian-speakers. This term is more 
expansive, including not only Russians by ethnocultural nationality but others accustomed to 
living and working in a Russophone environment who might, for this reason, identify 
politically with Russians in Soviet successor states and join them, for example, in resisting 
programs of linguistic nationalization.  
The fourth term, sootechestvenniki, means compatriots, that is people who share a common 
fatherland (otechestvo). In the post-Soviet context, however, this original, clearly political 
meaning has been overlaid by a melange of criteria based on some combination of descent, 
ethnicity, past citizenship, and spiritual-cultural orientation. This incongruous blend of legal, 
ethnographic, and identitarian notions has become the term of choice in official documents, 
perhaps precisely because of its ambiguity.  
The final term is grazhdane (citizens). The protection of citizens residing in other states, it 
would seem, is completely distinct from homeland nationalism, oriented to protecting non-
citizen co-nationals. Yet the distinction is not so clear-cut in the post-Soviet context. 
Grazhdane is often used metaphorically, as a synonym of sootechestvenniki, or 
compatriots;21 it is also used, again metaphorically, in connection with the claim that Russia 
has responsibility for all former Soviet citizens. Moreover, Russia has sought to convert 
conationals into fellow citizens. It has sought to conclude agreements on dual citizenship 
                                                 
20  In practice, to be sure, it was not always evident precisely who belonged to this population, especially in regions 
(such as Upper Silesia or parts of East Prussia) of fluid ethnocultural identity. In principle, how ever, everyone agreed 
that German claims as external national homeland concerned the Grenz- und Auslandsdeutsche of Central and 
Eastern Europe, and that these borderland and foreign Germans were defined by their ethnocultural nationality. 
21  Kolstoe, Russians, p. 261. 
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with other successor states. Failing that, it has begun to grant citizenship on application to 
individual petitioners from the near abroad, even to those who possess the citizenship of 
another successor state. Doing so on a large scale would strengthen Russia’s jurisdictional 
claims in the near abroad and provide a convenient pretext for intervention.  
The shifting and ambiguous vocabulary of homeland claims enables Russia to play in 
multiple registers, and to advance multiple and only partly overlapping jurisdictional claims in 
the near abroad. Through a kind of division of semantic labor, russkie provides cultural 
resonance and emotional power (and is therefore most useful in the context of domestic 
political competition), while rossiiane, russkoiazychnye, and sootechestvenniki (terms 
entirely foreign to everyday speech, and lacking – with the partial exception of the last – any 
kind of cultural resonance and emotional power) designate a broader target population and 
can therefore be used in international context and in official documents to expand Russia’s 
jurisdictional claims in the near abroad (and to represent those claims as transcending a 
narrow ethnic interest in protecting ethnic Russians). An expansive politics of citizenship, 
finally, enables Russia to combine the traditional (and from the point of view of international 
law more legitimate) rhetoric of protecting citizens in other states with homeland nationalist 
claims to protect noncitizen co-nationals. This opportunistic use of multiple idioms is further 
evinced in the somewhat incongruous marriage of a vocabulary of human rights to that of 
homeland nationalism, as in the frequent claim that Russia must protect the human rights of 
(ethnic) Russians in the near abroad.  
Conclusion 
Weimar homeland nationalism, I suggested above, was a complex web of political stances, 
cultural idioms, organizational networks, and transborder social relations. Russian homeland 
nationalism can also be regarded in this way. As a political phenomenon, homeland 
nationalism has been more salient, in both domestic and interstate contexts, in post-Soviet 
Russia than in Weimar Germany. Pronouncements on homeland nationalist themes have 
been more central to both governmental and oppositional political discourse, and to domestic 
political competition, than was the case in Weimar Germany. Like Weimar homeland 
nationalism, Russian homeland nationalism is doubly “intertwined” – both with domestic 
political competition and with efforts to consolidate Russian hegemony in the near abroad. In 
both domestic and interstate contexts, homeland nationalist stances have been deployed 
instrumentally, as a calculated means to other ends. But again as in Weimar, this 
instrumental exploitation of homeland nationalist stances has occurred against the 
background of taken-for-granted shared understandings concerning the plight of Russians in 
the near abroad and the obligation of the Russian state to do something on their behalf.  
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The dual embeddedness of homeland nationalism, as a political phenomenon, in wider 
domestic and interstate political contexts, means that it lacks its own autonomous logic and 
dynamic. As a political phenomenon, homeland nationalism is a set of moves, a set of 
stances, a family of related discursive claims – but the “game” in which these moves are 
activated, in which they pay off, or fail to pay off, is not any autonomous game of homeland 
politics, but rather the wider domestic and interstate “games”. The “value” or appropriateness 
of a homeland stance or move depends on the rules of the game and the resources 
possessed by competing players. In general, the greater international legitimacy and 
institutionalization of cross-border concern with minorities makes homeland nationalist 
“moves” – claims to support transborder minorities – more appropriate and useful as political 
“moves” than they were in the interwar period.  
As a cultural idiom, Russian homeland nationalism has been much more uncertain, 
ambiguous, and fluctuating than its Weimar counterpart. Weimar homeland nationalist 
discourse could build on the grossdeutsch, pre-unification tradition of the mid-nineteenth 
century and on the tradition of concern for Germans in the Habsburg and Romanov 
territories that developed in the late Bismarckian and Wilhelmine eras. Because of the lack of 
a comparable tradition in Russia, homeland nationalist discourse has had to be assembled 
by “bricolage” from various available and legitimate cultural “scraps”. Lacking indigenous 
roots, it has had to be cobbled together from a variety of discursive traditions: from 
“classical” homeland nationalism, from the legal rhetoric of diplomatic protection of citizens in 
other states, from human rights discourse, from the vocabulary of great power politics, from 
the rhetoric of post-imperial responsibility. As a result, the discourse has been multivocal and 
opportunistic, playing on multiple registers, and lacking consistency. The ambiguous and 
partly incongruous vocabulary for identifying the targets of homeland nationalist claims is but 
one indicator of this.  
As an organizational phenomenon, Russian homeland nationalism lacks the strong 
associational base in civil society that characterized Weimar homeland nationalism; the 
network of organizations concerned with Russians in the near abroad is therefore much 
more state-centered.  
As a social-relational phenomenon, finally, Russian homeland nationalism, like its Weimar 
counterpart, involves the cultivation and maintenance of cross-border relations and the 
provision of a flow of cross-border resources. The process of organizing resource flows and 
reconstituting networks and relations disrupted by the breakup of the Soviet Union is still 
incipient; and too little is known at present to make substantive claims about it. In the long 
run, however, the political disposition of Russian and Russophone minorities in the 
successor states – in particular, the degree to which and manner in which they look to 
Russia for solutions to their problems, rather than work them out within the frame of the 
successor states – will be significantly shaped by these relations and resource flows, and on 
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the degrees and forms of integration with Russia (and of detachment from successor state 
contexts) that they generate.  
In comparing Weimar Germany and post Soviet Russia, I’ve at the same time been making a 
broader comparison between the contexts and forms of homeland nationalism in the interwar 
period and the post-communist present. I want to come back to this broader comparison in 
conclusion. 
The inter-state system, I think, can “handle” the cross-border claims of homeland nationalism 
in a manner that simply wasn’t available in the interwar period. Then, the model of state 
sovereignty was much more robust. Precisely for this reason, borders were not sacralized 
and reified to the extent they are now. Because sovereignty was more absolute, it was more 
urgent, more compelling, to “get the borders right”. Because the principle of cuis regio eius 
natio was so entrenched, because it was assumed that states could do whatever they 
wanted to nationalize their territories, then it was seen as a more grievous problem if 
minorities were “misclassified”, assigned, as it were, to the “wrong” state. Now, when 
minorities are seen is being in “the wrong state”, this usually means the wrong status, the 
wrong condition, not the wrong side of the territorial border.  
I am deliberately over stating this point. It’s easy to think of exceptions and countervailing 
tendencies. But I do think that the logic of inter-state relations and of what John Meyer has 
called the “world polity” does make it possible to accommodate homeland nationalism today 
in a way that was not possible in the interwar period. This does not make me an optimist 
about Russia or the former Soviet Union. Far from it. But among the many grave problems 
facing the region, it seems to me, the danger of an aggressive Russian homeland 
nationalism is not as great as one might think.  
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